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NEED FOR REVISION AND AMPLIFICATION
OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION *
By K. M. BEAUMONT, C.B.E., D.S.O., M.A.
Senior Partner, law firm of Beaumont & Son, London, England,
which specializes in air law; an original Member of the Legal Com-
mittee of the I.A.T.A. and served on that Committee for about
twenty years; also as General Reporter of the Air Transport Com-
mittee of the International Chamber of Commerce, dealing, inter
alia, with revision of the Warsaw Convention; a Member of the
C.I.T.E.J.A. from 1945 until that Committee was superseded by the
Legal Committee of the I.C.A.O., since when he has served as a mem-
ber of the latter, and is now its Reporter concerning revision of the
Warsaw Convention. Joint author, with C. N. Shawcross, K.C.,
M.P., of "AIR LAW," 1945.
AT its Meeting in Montreal in June 1949 the Legal Committee of
the I.C.A.O. decided to suspend further consideration of revision
of the Warsaw Convention until they received from the writer a Report
on the subject together with a new draft Convention. The preparation
of this Report and new draft Convention, with Commentary thereon,
has again impressed upon the writer's mind the many defects and
obscurities in the existing Convention and the omission of provisions
concerning a number of matters which should be included in a Con-
vention regulating the liability of air carriers and the manner of deal-
ing with claims which arise from accidents and occurrences incidental
to air transport. It may therefore be of interest to call more specific
attention to these questions.
In the first place it is necessary to state that the text of the Warsaw
Convention quoted in this Article is taken from the English translation
scheduled to the Carriage by Air Act 1932. This translation from the
French original is not good, and it differs in a number of respects from
the American version, which is not official in the sense that it has not
statutory authority, since the only text for international purposes,
which is the French text, has been ratified by the U.S.A. as a self-
executory treaty.
ARTICLE 1 (1) of the Convention refers to the carriage of "persons,"
not "passengers." This has led to difficulties in connection with the
carriage of employees of the carrier, who may or may not be members
of the flying personnel and who may or may not be travelling in pur-
suance of their duties as employees of the carrier.
This paragraph also limits the scope of the Convention to carriage
"for reward" and gratuitous carriage by "an air transport undertaking,"
* Convention for the Unification of certain Rules relating to International
Carriage by Air, signed at Warsaw 12th October 1929.
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which is not defined. This raises an important question of principle,
namely as to whether the scope of the Convention should be limited in
this way, or whether its scope should be extended to cover all "inter-
national carriage" undertaken by anyone, whether for remuneration
or not. If the scope were so extended, the rules concerning liability,
and its limits, would apply to all operators of aircraft, including private
owners and their passengers. Sound arguments can be adduced both
for and against such an extension.
ARTICLE 1 (2) defines the expression "international carriage," to
which alone the rules of the Convention are applicable; and the ap-
plicability or otherwise of the Convention is dependent upon the place
of departure and the place of destination agreed upon between the
parties to a contract, which is regarded as a sine qua non. This prin-
ciple is, in fact, essential because the important thing is the carriage
which was agreed upon between the parties, and not the carriage per-
formed, because the latter may bear no relation to what was agreed,
for instance the case of an aircraft intended to make a long journey
which stops, owing to accident or otherwise, soon after starting, or
which carries the passenger or goods to a place which was not intended.
The latter point is important because a passenger who intends and
has agreed to make an "international" flight governed by the Conven-
tion should not be deprived of his rights under the Convention simply
because the carrier fails to perform the "international" flight intended
by both parties. Incidentally the words "according to the contract
made by the parties" is a somewhat free translation of the French
"d' apres les stipulations des parties."
Under the existing definition the only carriage governed by the
Convention is carriage in which "according to the contract made by
the parties" the places of departure and destination are situated either
within "the territories of two High Contracting Parties, or within the
territory of a single High Contracting Party if there is an agreed stop-
ping place within a territory" of another State. The expression "High
Contracting Party" has created difficulty, partly because in different
Articles it is used to mean two entirely different things, that is to say
"Contracting State" and "Signatory State."' Nowadays it is normal to
use the expression "Contracting State" to mean a State which has
ratified or adhered to a Convention, as distinct from a State which has
merely signed without having ratified.
The same paragraph also refers to "sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate
or authority" (omitting trusteeship) which have given rise to difficulty.
The modern equivalent 2 is "territories for the foreign relations of
which the Contracting State is responsible." This appears to meet the
difficulties created by the wording used in the Warsaw and Rome
Conventions.
I Articles 36-41.
2 Used in the Convention concerning the International Recognition of Rights
in Aircraft.
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There would seem to be no reason why the scope of the Convention
should not be widened to cover also carriage between two States either
(instead of both) of which is a Contracting State, since this would seem
to create no greater jurisdictional problems than exist under the pres-
ent Convention.
The intention of Article 1 (3) dealing with successive carriers is
clear enough, namely that for the purpose of deciding whether or not
"international carriage" is involved, one must regard the arrangement.
made between the carrier or his agent and the passenger or owner of
goods, as a whole to see if it discloses that the whole operation or trans-
action comes within the definition of the Convention. However, when
the test is applied to specific transactions, the legal meaning of the
phraseology used has given rise to doubts and difficulties, and this
paragraph could be improved.
ARTICLE 2 (1) makes reference to "legally constituted public
bodies," a phrase which is meaningless in English law. The French
text is "personnes juridiques de droit public." This has a definite con-
notation in those States which use the French language, but the writer
has not yet heard of a phrase in English which conveys exactly the
French meaning, probably because there is nothing exactly equivalent
to this in countries which adopt English law or law based thereon.
ARTICLE 2 (2). refers to "carriage performed under the terms of
any International Postal Convention." This would seem to restrict
the carriage concerned to "correspondence," as defined in, and carried
under, the provisions of the Universal Postal Convention. If so, it is
not wide enough to cover all mail, since by no means all mail (letter
and parcel post) falls within this definition which, under the Universal
Postal Convention, is limited to international correspondence.
ARTICLES 3 TO 11, deal with traffic documents- passenger tickets,
luggage tickets (baggage checks) and consignment notes (air waybills)
- in meticulous, but confused, detail concerning the particulars which
these should contain, including the obligatory particulars which must
appear if the carrier is to preserve his rights under the Convention to
defend claims and to have his liability limited. Since the object of
the Convention is to lay down rules relating to the liability of the
carrier and the rights of his clients so far as concerns all carriage which
falls within the scope of the Convention, there would seem to be no
necessity to cumber the Convention with traffic details of this character,
which are a nightmare to traffic clerks and which can much better be
left to carriers who are expert in such matters, especially since frequent
changes in traffic documents are necessary or desirable to deal with
questions of accountancy, records, customs and general convenience.
All the documents are required for the purpose of identity and receipt,
and the consignment note must comply with Customs requirements
since, as a practical measure, the Custom Authorities long ago agreed
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
to accept a copy of this document in lieu of a Customs declaration or
manifest. Furthermore, the existing provisions of these Articles are in
many cases obscure and in some cases absurd, as will appear from
what follows:
ARTICLE 3 (1) provides that the carrier must deliver passenger
tickets "which shall contain" a number of specified particulars; but
paragraph (2) merely provides that "if the carrier accepts a passenger
without a passenger ticket (contents unspecified) having been deliv-
ered, he shall not be entitled to avail himself of those provisions of this
Convention which exclude or limit his liability." The two paragraphs
appear to be self-conflicting, though it is clear that if no ticket (what-
ever its contents) is delivered, the carrier has no defence open to him
and his liability is unlimited. Some lawyers consider that this may be
the effect even if the ticket delivered lacks any of the particulars speci-
fied in paragraph (1), though paragraph (2) states that the absence,
irregularity or loss of the ticket does not affect the contract or the
applicability thereto of the provisions of the Convention. In any event
the penalty for failure to deliver a ticket seems positively savage.
Sub-paragraph (c) of Article 3 (1) concerning the obligation to
insert "the agreed stopping places" has created much difficulty, and
its real meaning and intention are obscure. Carriers generally attempt
to comply with this requirement by inserting in the ticket a reference
to their timetables, as indicating the "agreed stopping places," which
may be altered "in case of necessity." The word "necessity" should be
noted. Evidently it would not entitle the carrier to alter an agreed
stopping place unless necessity arose. The object of inserting at least
one agreed stopping place is important when carriage between two
territories of the same State is involved because, unless there is an
agreed stopping place in another State, the carriage would not be
"international." If the agreed carriage is between two Contracting
States, there is no need to insert an agreed stopping place in order to
establish that the carriage is "international." Therefore in this case
it might suffice to insert "none" in the rubric for agreed stopping
places, indicating that no stopping place is agreed, although several
stops might be made and indicated in timetables. It would be safer in
all cases to insert at least one agreed stopping place in a State other than
the State of departure. This Article is a jumble of obscurities.
Very similar remarks apply to Article 4 concerning the "luggage
ticket," the expression used to describe the baggage check. In this case
again it is declared that the luggage ticket "shall contain" particulars
listed under eight headings; but paragraph (4) of the Article provides
that "if the carrier accepts luggage without a luggage ticket having
been delivered, or if the luggage ticket does not contain" three of the
eight specified particulars, "the carrier shall not be entitled to avail
himself of those provisions of the Convention which exclude or limit
his liability," that is to say he is deprived of all defences and is subjected
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to unlimited liability. It is doubtful if the draftsmen really intended
this.
"Agreed stopping places" are not required in the luggage ticket,
but the number of the passenger ticket is an obligatory particular. In
practice nowadays the carriers, members of the I.A.T.A., use one docu-
ment comprising both the passenger ticket and the luggage ticket,
which contains rubrics for all the particulars required by Articles 3'
and 4.
One of the obligatory particulars in the baggage check is "the num-
ber and weight of the packages," not the baggage. In consequence of
this, and of the wording of Article 22 (2), which refers to "the pack-
age," the opinion of some lawyers is that, in order to comply with the
stringent' provisions of paragraph (4), it is necessary that the weight
of each package comprised in the baggage covered by a luggage ticket
should be shown separately therein or that a separate baggage check
be issued for each package comprised in the baggage. This is not done
in practice, and carriers may be running serious risk in consequence.
Also, the practice differs in various countries as to the basis of com-
pensation payable when part of the baggage is lost or damaged. Some
base the compensation under Article 22 (2), upon the weight of the
whole of the baggage comprised in the baggage check, and some only
on that portion of it which is lost or damaged. There is no clear indi-
cation in the Convention to show which method is right.
ARTICLES 5 AND 6 require the consignor (shipper) to make out
consignment notes in triplicate for cargo. Yet Article 9 deprives the
carrier of his defences and imposes upon him unlimited liability if any
one of ten obligatory particulars is not included, regardless of the fact
that some of the particulars are only known to the carrier and some of
them are only known to the consignor. In actual practice the carrier
usually completes the consignment note on behalf of consignors as
their agents, upon instructions from consignors who obviously must
furnish particulars of cargo, leaving the carriers to insert traffic par-
ticulars required.
ARTICLE 7 gives the carrier the right to require a separate consign-
ment note for each " package." This has a bearing upon Article 22 (2)
in connenction with the assessment of compensation for loss or damage.
It raises great difficulties concerning construction, for reasons similar
to those referred to in connection with the luggage ticket (Article 4 (2)
(f) and (4) above).
ARTICLE 8 provides that the consignment note shall contain seven-
teen specified particulars, only ten of which, however, are obligatory
under Article 9, as mentioned above. Some of these, namely those
relating to the cargo, can obviously be supplied only by the consignor;
the others, relating to the carriage itself can only be supplied by the
carrier. Yet, as mentioned above, the obligation to complete the
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whole of the consignment note is cast upon the consignor under
Articles 5 and 6, though the carrier is subjected to unlimited liability
without defence if any of ten obligatory particulars is omitted. This
makes the strict legal position quite absurd. The draftsmen of the
Convention omitted to take into consideration the practical aspects
applicable to carriage of cargo. Remarks similar to those made above
(in connection with Article 3) apply to "agreed stopping places." In
Article 8 (h) reference is made to "the number of the packages,"
which has reference to Article 22 (2) ; but paragraph (i) refers to "the
weight, the quantity and the volume or dimensions of the goods," not
"packages," so that in this case, unlike the case of baggage, a separate
weight for each "package" is not tequired, though under Article 7 the
carrier can require a separate consignment note for each "package."
The obscurity and confusion involved in these provisions could hardly
be worse.
ARTICLE 9. The unfortunate consequences' of this Article for the
carrier, if details of which he may have no knowledge are missing, have
been referred to aboveA
ARTICLE 10, makes the consignor "responsible for the correctness
of the particulars and statements relating to the goods which he inserts
in the consignment note." In this case it evidently dawned upon the
draftsmen that the consignor coud not necessarily complete all the par-
ticulars required; but this Article is in conflict with Articles 5 and 6,
which require the consignor to make out the consignment note, while
at the same time, under Article 9, making the carrier liable for terrible
consequences if the particulars are incomplete.
ARTICLE 11 deals with the weight of evidence to be given to the
various categories of particulars furnished concerning cargo, and the
party against which such evidence is prima facie available. The writer
is of opinion that none of the provisions of Articles 3 to 11 inclusive
are necessary in a Convention dealing with the rights and liabilities of
the parties to a contract of carriage by air, and that it would be better
that they should be omitted altogether, leaving the parties to provide
traffic documents or other evidence as to the terms of contract, and
simply to provide that all contracts which fall within the scope of
the Convention are subject to the provisions of the Convention, what-
ever the contract may say, leaving to the party seeking to enforce a
contract the obligation to prove what its terms were. In the event
of the principles of the Articles concerned being retained, it is obvious
for reasons given above that these would require drastic revision in
order to remove the obscurities, anomalies, contradictions and ab-
surdities which exist at present.
ARTICLES 12, 13, 14 AND 15 deal with the consignor's right to stop
or re-direct the cargo in transit; and the consignee's rights on arrival
3 See observations on Article 8.
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of the cargo at destination, or in the event of its loss. They call for no
special comment, although Articles 12 and 13 are'cumbersome and
could be improved and shortened, especially if Articles 3 to 11 are
eliminated, as suggested above. No provision is made for the case
when the carrier is unable to despatch or deliver cargo through no
fault of his own.
ARTICLE 16 casts upon the consignor the obligation to supply infor-
mation and documents necessary to enable cargo to be- delivered, in-
cluding Customs requirements. This Article might not be necessary
if Articles 3 to 11 are eliminated.
DEATH OR INJURY
ARTICLE 17 provides for the carrier's liability "in the event of the
death or wounding.of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by
a passenger if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took
place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of
embarking or disembarking." This Article is full of pitfalls and
obscurities: -
(a) Does it cover the liability of officials, employees and agents
of the carrier? It has been suggested that employees can be sued
separately and that they are not protected by the limited liability under
Article 22. It should be noted that in Article 25 "any agent of the
carrier acting within the scope of his employment" is referred to. It
would seem that a similar reference should be made in Article 17 or
Article 22, if not both.
(b) The wording of the Article would cover the death or wound-
ing of a passenger by another passenger on board the aircraft, or dam-
age sustained by illness, or, for instance, a miscarriage. It is suggested
that it should be limited to damage sustained as a direct result of an
accident attributable to the air carriage.
(c) No indication is given as to when the operations of embark-
ing or disembarking begin or end, either at an airport or anywhere
else, for instance in the case of a forced or accidental landing. The
operations of embarkation might be said to begin when the passenger
reaches the airport, or when he is summoned by an official to proceed
to Customs or other authority prior to departure, or when he is re-
quested to proceed to the embarkation area, or when he steps from
the embarkation area into the apparatus leading to the aircraft, or
when he actually enters the aircraft. Similarly, the operations of dis-
embarkation might be said to end at any time from the moment when
the passenger leaves the aircraft until the moment when he leaves
the airport buildings after completion of immigration, passport, health,
police, Customs' and other formalities. Much greater certainty is re-
quired, including certainty concerning the period of liability in the
case of forced or accidental landings.
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(d) There is no provision for consequential damage, for instance
damage sustained in boats or rafts after a descent on the sea, or sus-
tained when attempting to reach a place of safety or civilisation after
an accident or forced landing in a desert region or away from civilisa-
tion. A case occurred recently when a passenger was flung out of an
aircraft during a forced landing. She was not seriously hurt, but a
minute or two afterwards there was an explosion of fuel which dam-
ager her very badly. Her lawyers claimed that this damage was outside
the scope of the Convention, because the damage was caused after
disembarkation, and that consequently the compensation was not
limited.
(e) No distinction is drawn between wounding or bodily injury
and disablement, total or partial, temporary or permanent. If, as has
been suggested, different limits should be imposed for different cate-
gories of injury, it would be necessary to classify these carefully and
distinctly.
(f) It is not clear if mental injury is covered by the Article, for
instance anything ranging from temporary mental derangement to
permanent madness.
It will be obvious from what appears above that very drastic re-
vision and amplification of this Article are required.
ARTICLE 18 deals with the carrier's liability for loss of, or damage to,
goods and registered baggage occurring "during the carriage by air,"
and paragraph (2) defines what is meant by "carriage by air." It dif-
fers materially from the formula used in Article 17 for obvious rea-
sons, and "comprises the period during which the luggage or goods are
in charge of the carrier" (presumably intended to include his employ-
ees) whether in an aerodrome or on board an aircraft or, in the case
of a landing outside an aerodrome, in any place whatsoever." It is not
clear if goods in bond or customs in or near an airport are "in an aero-
drome," or what exactly comprises an aerodrome, especially in the case
of a sea or water airport. Also, surely the period should cover goods
in transference by surface transport from one airport to another in the
custody of the carrier's employees in the course of a journey involving
stages. It is suggested that the proper formula should extend from the
time when the goods are placed in the custody of the carrier's employ-
ees at the airport of departure until they are delivered to the Customs
Authorities at the airport of destination or, in the case of a forced or
accidental landing en route, to the Customs or other authorised place
near the landing, including any surface transport which may be
involved in complying with the contract to carry from the place of
departure to destination, and that any surface transport in the course
of such carriage should be covered by the Convention - not only sur-
face transport in the case of a landing outside an aerodrome, as pro-
vided by the Article. Paragraph (3) of Article 18 refers to this aspect
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of the matter, without however dealing with it. ft provides that the
carriage by air does not extend to any surface transport outside an aero-
drome, but that when there is surface transport outside an aerodrome
"which takes place in the performance of a contract of carriage by air
for the purpose of loading, delivery or trans-shipment," it shall be
presumed, in default of proof to the contrary, that any damage sus-
tained happened during the carriage by air. But this merely deals
with the presumption, and not with the difficulty that surface transport
outside an aerodrome is not governed by the Convention, although it
may well form part of the performance of the contract to carry from
place of departure to place of destination. This Article also therefore
requires substantial amendment.
ARTICLE 19 provides that "the carrier is liable for damage occa-
sioned by delay in the carriage by air of passengers, luggage or goods."
This is completely vague and obscure. How is delay reckoned? Is it
based on published time tables in the case of passengers or in the case
of cargo? If not, when does the period in respect of which a claim
for delay can be made begin to run? Article 17 gives no guidance.
Cannot the carrier escape all liability for delay by stipulating that he
cannot and will not guarantee times of departure or arrival or the
making of connections? What ratio of delay should give rise to a
claim? Should it be minutes or days? Similar problems arise in con-
nection with luggage which normally accompanies a passenger, whether
or not it is registered baggage. In the case of cargo, it is suggested
that the carrier may be able to repudiate liability by refusing to guar-
antee any time for departure or arrival. Even in the case of perishable
goods (and live animals if they can properly be included in the term
.'goods"), it would hardly be reasonable to bind the carrier to ac-
curate times, in view of the many circumstances appertaining to air
transport. The formula for "period of carriage by air" in Article 18
does not help, and it is suggested that Article 19 is really meaningless
in its present form. Something very much more definite is required.
ARTICLE 20 (1) provides that "the carrier is not liable if he proves
that he and his agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid the
damage or that it was impossible for him or them to take such meas-
ures." In the first place it should be noted that in this case the agents
of the carrier are mentioned, though they are not in Articles 17, 18,
19 or 22. Secondly, it is obvious that if all necessary measures to avoid
the damage had been taken no damage could have occurred. Instead
of "necessary," the word used should be "reasonable or "proper"
(French "utile") . The latter (as used in Article 5 of the Rome
Convention) is preferable, since the word "reasonable" is not nor-
mally used in this connection in some legal systems, though in
English law the word "necessary" has been construed as "reasonably
necessary" or "reasonable. ' 4 Presumably the concluding words of this
4 Grein v. Imperial Airways Ltd. (1937) 1 K.B. 50; (1936) all E.R. 1258;
(1936) USAvR 211.
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paragraph refer to cases of force majeure only, but the paragraph re-
quires amendment.
If the word "proper" is substituted for the word "necessary" it
appears to the writer that the meaning of the paragraph would be in
accordance with the intention of the draftsmen,. namely that the car-
rier has a. good defence if he proves to the satisfaction of the Court
that he and his agents have taken all measures which a good carrier
would normally take (i.e. the high degree of care required of a com-
mon carrier in the United States), and that he is not responsible for
damage sustained through circumstances amounting to force majeure.
What does amount to force majeure might vary in'different circum-
cumstances. For instance, in certain cases lightning might cause dam-
age, although the writer has twice been in an aircraft struck by
lightning which caused no serious damage. If damage were caused
by lightning the Court might enquire whether meteorological reports
indicated that thunderstorms were anticipated upon the proposed route
of the aircraft, and, if so, whether a good carrier should or should not
have cancelled the flight; whether the pilot took steps to avoid the
thunderstorm area or should have done so; whether the aircraft was
or should have been equipped with devices to render innocuous the
effect of a flash of lightning passing through the aircraft from one
cloud to another in its search for an "earth." As a result of such en-
quiries, the Court might find that all proper measures had not been
taken. Similarly, if the damage was caused through the action of a
maniac, or of passengers under the influence of drink or drugs, the
Court might enquire if the carrier had taken proper measures to guard
against and deal with such possible occurrences and their consequences.
In any of such, or similar, cases, the Court might well find that it was
not impossible for the carrier or his agents to have taken measures to
avoid damage caused by events of this character in a particular case.
It is suggested that the carrier would have a good defence if he could
prove that the damage was caused by a latent defect in the design or
structure of the aircraft, if the latter had a current Certificate of Air-
worthiness, and the daily Certificate of Safety was properly completed.
This would not prejudice claims based on negligence by injured par-
ties against the aircraft constructor, or even perhaps against parties who
had negligently issued the Certificate of Airworthiness. For the purpose
of the new draft Convention proposed by the writer, he has suggested
the following formula: -
"(1) The carrier is not liable if he proves that he and his em-
ployees took all proper measures to avoid the damage, or that it
was impossible for him and them to take such measures.
(2) In the case of hand baggage, the carrier is liable under the
provisions of Article 12 (2) [this is the paragraph dealing with the
period of liability in connection with hand baggage] only if the pas-
sanger proves that the damage was due to the negligence of the
carrier or his employees.
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(3) Any deviation made for the purpose of saving life, or for
reasons of safety or meteorological conditions, or other reasonable
deviation, shall not constitute a breach of the contract or carriage,
and the carrier shall not incur any liability merely by reason of
such deviation."
ARTICLE 20 (2) is curious. It relates only to goods and luggage, and
provides that the-carrier is not liable if he proves that the damage was
occasioned by negligent pilotage or negligence in the handling of the
aircraft or in navigation. It is believed that this is a misapplication
of a marine rule. The result is that, if the carrier furnishes the proof
required under paragraph (2), he automatically deprives himself of
the chance of proving his non-liability under paragraph (1). The
Legal Commtitee of the I.C.A.O., and its predecessor the C.I.T.E.J.A.,
took such a poor view of paragraph (2) that, on each occasion when it
has been discussed, it has decided that it' should be omitted from any
future Convention.
ARTICLE 21 applies the normal rule of contributory negligence; but
it is defective because it refers only to the uninjured person and not
also, as it should, to the party suffering damage. They may not be the
same.
ARTICLE 22, deals with the limits of the carrier's liability. As above
mentioned, there is no reference to employees of the carrier, and some
lawyers have suggested in consequence that employees, for instance
pilots, are not entitled to the limiting provisions in the event of action
being taken against them outside the provisions of the Convention
which, in Articles 17, 18 and 19, refers only to the carrier.
DISCUSSION OF LIMITS
The limit of liability in respect of passengers is 125,000 Poincare
francs, 125 of such francs being equivalent to £1 gold. The present
equivalent of 125,000 of such francs is about £2,040 sterling, or $8,160
United States currency. This limit applies to claims in respect of death,
wounding, injury or delay (see Articles 17 and 19). It has been sug-
gested that different limits might properly be applied to (a) death,
(b) permanent disablement, (c) injury short of permanent disable-
ment and (d) delay respectively. If this principle is adopted it would
be necessary to define "permanent disablement" and perhaps to specify,
for a death claim, that death should supervene within a stated time
from the date of the accident which caused it. Paragraph (1) of the
Article provides that the parties may, by special contract, agree a higher
limit, and refers to "the Court seized of the case," which means the
Court trying the action.
During the last twelve years, since when revision of the Convention
has been under consideration, a good deal of discussion has ranged
round the question of increasing, or otherwise, the limit of liability
of the carrier for the death or injury of a passenger, though actually
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this is one of the least important questions involved, because even if
the limit for death, or permanent disablement or other injury, or all
three, were to be increased by say 50%, it would not have a great
effect on anybody concerned. For instance, on the death of a passenger,
or if he is injured, it does not make very much difference if he or his
estate or dependents receive a maximum of £2,000 or £3,000. On the
other hand, since one can insure the risk of death for 24 hours at a
premium of 2/- (half a dollar) per LI,000 or $4,000, the cost of
insuring the carrier's risk of liability to a similar amount should be
less. Consequently, an addition of 2/-or less to an Atlantic fare of
about £80 (320 can be considered negligible.
Sound arguments can be advanced both for and against an increase
in the limit of liability towards passengers. It is significant that, in
response to a questionnaire on the subject circulated to Governments
in 1948, nineteen Contracting States replied and of these nine favoured
an increase ranging from 100% downwards.
One of the main arguments for justifying a limit at all is that, in
consideration of this, the passenger does not have to prove negligence,
as would be normal, because the onus of proof that he has taken "all
necessary measures to avoid the damage" is cast upon the carrier in
Article 20. One of the main arguments for an increase is that the
existing limit is much lower than damages which are frequently
awarded as compensation in many States. For instance, an English
Court recently awarded a lady £12,500 for permanent disfigurement
caused by an explosion, although she was not disabled; and damages
from £5,000 to £10,000 have been awarded for loss of a hand or foot.
Owing to the Convention limits being based on gold, they now rep-
resent in currency about double what they did in 1929. Some argue
that this reflects adequately the increased cost of living. Others main-
tain that it does not, or that the cost of living has no bearing on the
question. Any limit must be arbitrary. The average compensation
paid for death or injury in accidents outside the Convention, when
negligence has to be proved, would not seem to exceed greatly, if at all,
the Convention limits. This is no doubt accounted for partly by the
fact that in death claims it often happens that no one suffers financial
damage from the death, for instance if the deceased had no dependents.
On the other hand, if there were no limit imposed by the Convention,
it is possible that in many cases damages very largely exceeding the
existing limit could be justified.
It seems to the writer that undue importance may have been at-
tached to this question, which really has nothing like the importance of
most of the other questions conected with revision of the Convention,
especially since everyone can, for a modest rate of premium, insure
absolutely any risks of air carriage up to almost any amount, and be
sure of receiving the sum insured with no risk of the carrier being able
to prove that he was not liable under the provisions of Articles 20 or 21.
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ARTICLE 22 (2) provides that the limit for registered luggage and
goods shall be "250 francs per kilogram"; but it does not say if this is
the weight of all the baggage comprised in a luggage ticket or all the
cargo comprised in a consignment note, or if it is meant to refer only
to that portion of the baggage or cargo which is lost, damaged or
delayed.5
This Article also provides for the consignor to make "a special
declaration of the value at delivery" when "the package was handed
over to the carrier," and for the payment of a "supplementary sum if
the case so requires," in which event "the carrier will be liable to pay
a sum not exceeding the declared sum, unless he proves that that sum
is greater than the actual value to the consignor at delivery." This
phraseology gives rise to several problems.
"Special declaration of value at delivery" is a translation of the
French expression "intert a la livraison," which would, generally
speaking, include cost, insurance, freight and the value to the consignee
(not the consignor) of the goods if delivered punctually to him in good
order at the place of destination specified in the contract, although at
the end of paragraph (2) it is perfectly true that the French text also
refers very literally to "real interest of the consignor at delivery,"
which presumably means the value to the consignor in having the
goods delivered although it would seem that the main interest in deliv-
ery of the goods at a special time and place would be that of the
consignee.
The reference to "the package" also raises questions. As above
mentioned, Article 4 (3) (f), dealing with registered baggage, refers
to "the number and weight of the, packages"; which gives force to the
argument that each item of baggage should be shown on the baggage
check with a separate weight for the purpose of Article 22 (2) . But in
Article 8 (i) relating to goods, the corresponding provision is "the
weight of the goods," not each package, or "the package," perhaps
because Article 7 gives the carrier the right to require separate con-
signment notes "When there is more than one package." If he fails
to take advantage of this provision it appears that he may be running
a risk. It is all very confusing and obscure.
ARTICLE 23,'the principle of which is repeated in Article 32, pro-
vides that provisions of the contract which infringe the Convention
rules are void. This calls for no comment.
ARTICLE (1) enunciates the obvious principle that actions concern-
ing baggage and cargo under Articles 18 and 19 can only be brought
subject to the conditions and limits of the Convention and paragraph
(2) applies the same principle to death claims under Article 17 "with-
out prejudice to the question as to who are the persons who have the
5 See also remarks above concerning Articles 18 and 19, and especially as to
the difference between baggage and cargo under Articles 4 and 8.
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right to bring suits and what are their respective rights." This latter
phrase leaves in doubt (a) the persons entitled to claim or bring suit
in the event of death, (b) the persons entitled to participate in com-
pensation awarded or agreed and (c) the law to be applied to the distri-
bution and allocation of any such compensation. The persons entitled
to bring suit may not be the same as those entitled to participate in
the compensation, It is very necessary for carriers to know the parties
entitled to give effective receipts for compensation awarded or agreed;
and it is suggested that the law applicable to distribution should be
that governing the moveable property of the deceased. This paragraph
requires substantial elaboration.
ARTICLE 25 deals with the important question of "wilful miscon-
duct," the presence of which, if proved against the carrier "or any
agent of his acting within the scope of his employment," has the effect
of depriving him of the benefit of "the provisions of the Convention
which exclude or limit his liability."
In the first place, the French text, which is the only one for inter-
national purposes, and which governs in the U.S.A. since ratification of
the Convention as a self-executory treaty, uses the word "dol," which
has no exact connotation in the English language. It has been trans-
lated as "wilful misconduct" which, although not exactly translating
"dol," has been the subject of many pronouncements by high judicial
authority." "Dol" and "wilful misconduct" must be distinguished
from negligence, whether qualified or not by such adjectives as "gross"
or "criminal." Yet in some States "dol" has been translated to mean
"wilful misconduct or gross negligence." The phrase used in the Eng-
lish translation of the Convention is "by wilful misconduct or by such
default on his part as, in accordance with the law of the Court seized
of the case (meaning trying the action) is considered to be equivalent
to wilful misconduct." It seems that what the draftsmen intended
was that the word "dol" should be used in States where that word has
an exact connotation and that in other States the nearest equivalent
should be used. The English translators translated the French exactly,
supplying the expression "wilful misconduct" to signify "dol," although
it is difficult to understand what equivalent for "wilful misconduct"
there could be under the law of those countries in which "wilful mis-
conduct" is used and in which judicial pronouncements as to its
meaning have been given over a long period of years.
This aspect of the matter opens the door to different interpretations
of the phraseology used in the Convention, which indeed have been
applied by different Courts. The writer suggests that, as the word
"dol" has a connotation which is not properly translatable into some
languages, perhaps because the idea behind the word is unknown in
See Lewis v. Great Western Railway Company (1877) 3 Q.B.D. 195; Forder
v. Great Western Railway Company (1905) 2 K.B. 532; in re City Equitable Fire
Insurance Co. Ltd. (1925) 1 Chancery Div. 407; and Ritts. v. American Overseas
Airlines (USAvR, March 1949).
NEED FOR REVISION OF WARSAW CONVENTION
some countries, neither this word nor the expression "wilful miscon-
duct" should be used; and that, instead, the idea inherent in the prin-
ciple should be incorporated in the Convention, bringing out the es-
sential features required, as laid down by high judicial authority. It is
no use explaining that green is a mixture of blue and yellow to a man
who is colour blind.
At present, if "wilful misconduct" is proved against the carrier or
any "agent" of his acting within the scope of his employment, he is
entitled to set up no defence under the Convention (for instance under
Articles 10, 16, 20, 21, 26 and 29) and his liability is unlimited. Ob-
viously this is a most important and serious Article for the carrier.
Apart from defining what is meant by "dol" or "wilful misconduct,"
instead of using these expressions, it has been suggested that the prin-
ciple should be applicable only to the carrier himself and to parties
who on his behalf control or manage his business, and not to employees
such as flying and ground personnel. There may be justification for the
adoption of the latter principle in the fact that an act or omission
amounting to "wilful misconduct" could not be done or omitted by
an employee "within the scope of his employment." The whole sub-
ject requires thought owing to the serious issues and potential damages
involved in connection with aircraft carrying large numbers of pas-
sengers and heavy and valuable loads of cargo.
ARTICLE 26 deals with the times within which claims in respect of
cargo or baggage must be lodged in various categories, failing compli-
ance with which they will be inadmissible. The times specified are
much shorter than those normally allowed by carriers who are members
of the I.A.T.A. and might consequently be lengthened. The Article
makes no mention of the time allowed for claims relating to injury
to passengers, whether resulting in death or not.
ARTICLE 27 provides that if the party liable dies, the liability passes
to those representing his estate, in fact laying down that the principle
"actio personalis moritur cum persona" does not apply. No comment
arises on this Article.
ARTICLE 28 establishes the various Courts in which the plaintiff may
take action. Such Courts must of course be in a Contracting State.
If the scope of the Convention is widened, as suggested in connection
with Article 1 (2), it would be necessary to revise this Article accord-
ingly. It should be noted that Article 28 refers to "the option of the
plaintiff," which may mean that he must exercise an option to choose
one only of the various courts specified, though hitherto it has been
supposed that the plaintiff may proceed in all or any of the specified
courts.
ARTICLE 29 prescribes the period of two years for taking action. It
has been suggested that this period might be limited to one year. This,
of course, has nothing to do with the time for making claims under
Article 26.
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ARTICLE 30 (2) raises problems, which are largely due to a bad
translation of the French text. It provides that "the passenger or his
representative can take action" etc. The French text reads "le voyageur
ou ses ayants droit," which is believed to mean anyone entitled to take
action arising from the death, including "legal personal representa-
tives" (in the English legal sense meaning parties representing the
estate of the deceased), dependants (parties financially dependent on
the deceased) and perhaps parties interested in the services of the
deceased. In any new Convention (which would have English, French
and Spanish texts) the exact meaning and intention should be properly
and correspondingly expressed in all three. It is suggested that the
paragraph should be completely redrafted to provide that, in case of
death, action must be taken by the person or persons legally entitled
to represent the estate of the deceased on behalf of all persons who have
suffered damage by reason of the death and who are entitled to claim
in respect thereof.
ARTICLE 30 (3), which must be read in conjunction with Article
28 (1), raises the possibility that a consignor or passenger may take
action in respect of cargo or baggage against the first carrier in one
State, a consignee or passenger may take action against the last carrier
in another State, and both may take action against an intermediate
carrier in another State, arisifig from the same loss, damage or delay
of cargo or baggage, since each is given rights as plaintiff, and under
Article 28 (1) each plaintiff may choose his own jurisdiction, and per-
haps more than one.7 This possible multiplicity of actions may create
difficulties for the carrier which may not have been intended. In fact
instances of this have occurred. It would seem wise to reconsider this
aspect in connection with any revised Convention.
ARTICLE 31 deals with combined carriage, performed partly by air
and partly by other modes of carriages, and provides that the Conven-
tion rules shall apply only to the air carriage. Upon this, observations
in connection with Article 18 have a bearing.
ARTICLE 32 states the obvious rule that provisions in a contract
which infringe the Convention rules shall be null and void, following
Article 23; and provides for arbitration in connection with the carriage
of goods. This Article calls for no comment.
ARTICLE 33 gives the carrier the right to refuse to enter into any
contract of carriage, and to make regulations which do not conflict
with the rules of the Convention. It is not within the scope of this
Article to discuss the position of "common" or other carriers under
various legal systems.
ARTICLE 34 exempts from the provisions of the Convention "car-
riage by air performed by way of experimental trial by air navigation
7See observations on Article 28.
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undertakings with the view to the establishment of a regular line of
air navigation, nor does it apply to carriage performed in extraordinary
circumstances outside the normal scope of an air carrier's business."
The writer feels that this Article might well be suppressed. There
seems no reason why passengers or carriers should be deprived of their
respective rights under the Convention in the circumstances mentioned.
If carriers carry, for remuneration or gratuitously, passengers on such
flights, and the passengers desire to engage in them, it seems reasonable
that the Convention rules should apply. The Article has created diffi-
culty as to the meaning of "experimental trial"; s and "air navigation
undertaking" is not defined.
ARTICLE 35 seeks to define "days" as "current days not working
days." It is suggested that this definition should be "consecutive calen-
dar days, not working days" following precedent.
ARTICLE 36 declares that the Convention is drawn up in French in
a single copy which remains deposited in the archives of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs in Poland. It is normal nowadays to have Conven-
tions in English, French and Spanish, all of which are of equal validity;
and to provide for deposit in the archives of the I.C.A.O.
ARTICLES 37 TO 41 are formal; but the expression "High Contract-
ing Party" is used in different Articles to mean two entirely different
things, namely a Signatory State (meaning a State which has signed
but not ratified) and a Contracting State (meaning a State which has
ratified or adhered to the Convention). In Articles 37 to 40 it is used
in both senses. In Article 38 it is not clear if Signatory State or Con-
tracting State is meant. In Articles 39 and 41 it is used to mean Contract-
ing State. This confusion led to the House of Lords, the highest judi-
cial authority in the United Kingdom, to decide 9 in an action upon a
contract comprised in a consignment note, incorporating the I.A.T.A.
Conditions of Carriage based on the Convention, that (a) "High Con-
tracting Parties to the Convention of Warsaw" in this clause (i.e. the
clause in the Conditions) included all the original signatories to the
Convention, whether they had subsequently ratified or not; (b) the
Orders made under Section 1 (2) of the Carriage by Air Act 1932 had
no operation on the construction of a contract relating to carriage not
subject to the Act, and that therefore (c) carriage from Great Britain
(which had ratified) to Belgium (which had signed but not ratified)
fell within the category of "international carriage" (referred to in
the Conditions, which reproduce the definition in the Convention), al-
though it was not subject to the Carriage by Air Act 1932 under which
the Warsaw Convention was adopted by the law of England.
From what appears above it will be observed that almost every
Article of the existing Convention includes defects or obscurities, and
8 In the case of the SABENA aircraft which crashed at Gander when making
one of six trial flights under special permit from the C.A.B.
9 In Phillipson v. Imperial Airways Ltd. (1939) A.C. 322; (1939) 1 All E.R.
761; (1939) USAvR 63; Digest-Supp.
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some of them contain several. These are not merely theoretical or
technical defects. On the contrary they cause almost daily practical
difficulties and problems for the carrier, insurers and lawyers dealing
with claims and actions arising from an ever-increasing volume of air
carriage. It would seem that now, twenty years after the Convention
was signed, it is surely time that these defects should be rectified. Every
time the Convention comes under legal review, uncomplimentary
observations concerning its bad drafting are made.
ERRORS OF OMISSION
Unfortunately this aspect of the matter is not the end of the sad
story, because what appears above deals only with errors of commission.
It is now necessary to call attention to errors of omission, namely to
matters which should be dealt with in any revised Convention and
which are not dealt with in the existing one, as follows: -
(a) The position concerning the rights and obligations of the
parties, when it is impossible to effect despatch or delivery of cargo
should be regularised.
(b) There should be provision for a carrier's lien on cargo, to
cover expenses involved over storage, etc. when cargo cannot be
despatched or delivered through some fault of the consignor or
consignee.
(c) It may be found desirable to make provision in a revised
Convention for negotiability of the Air Consignment Note.
(d) It is most necessary to make provision for charters, that is to
say, the case when the whole capacity of an aircraft is chartered for a
particular voyage or series of voyages (Voyage Charter) or on voyages
to be ordered by the charterer during a specified period (Time Char-
ter) . Both these types of charter fall into two categories, namely when
the charterer uses the capacity of the aircraft for himself and his
friends, or the case when the charterer himself employs space in the
chartered aircraft in carriage for remuneration. In the former case
the operator alone is the carrier, and the charterer is in the position
of a passenger; in the second case, the charterer becomes a "carrier"
because he himself makes a contract to carry. Charters of various kinds
are nowadays very common, and it is important that the legal position
of owners, operators, carriers and charterers respectively should be
properly regularised.
(e) As mentioned above, in connection with Articles 17, 18
and 19, it is necessary to define clearly the various periods during
which the carrier should be liable in relation respectively to passengers,
baggage and cargo, and in relation to delay in each case.
(f) Provision should be made for deviation on a voyage.
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(g) Provision is required to deal with specially valuable articles,
as is normal in other spheres where such articles are involved.
(h) It may be desirable to incorporate in a revised Convention
provision for staying subsequent actions, when more than one is com-
menced in different States, until the first action has been decided, in
order to protect the carrier from a multiplicity of actions at the same
time in different States, or that the plaintiff must exercise an option to
choose one court only, if, in fact, a plaintiff is entitled to take action
in more than one Court arising out of the same cause of action under
existing Article 28.
(i) It is very necessary for provision to be made for the law ap-
plicable in actions for compensation arising from death; also as to
the parties entitled to claim and give receipts, and the parties entitled
to participate in compensation awarded or agreed, and the method of
distribution and allocation of such compensation.
(j) Provision is required to deal with territories of a Contracting
State which change their status, either by acquiring independence or
by. passing from the sovereignty or authority of one State to that of
another, whether a Contracting State or not. This has a most impor-
tant bearing upon the territories which come within the scope of, and
are bound by, the provisions of the Convention, or not, as the case
may be, especially since the character of the carriage concerned, that
is to say whether it is "international" or not, is dependent upon the
status of such territories.
(k) Finally, there is the all-important question of definitions,
very few of which are incorporated in the present Convention. Conse-
quently, practising lawyers are always being faced with problems con-
cerning the real meaning and intention of many words and phrases
used. The definition of "operator" is of special importance, especially
since the definition in Article 5 of the Rome Convention is not satis-
factory. Some other definitions which are almost essential are those
of "carrier," "charter," "contract of carriage," "employee," "last car-
rier," "officials" and "passenger," for reasons which will be apparent
to those who study the July 1949 draft of a new Convention prepared
by the writer for submission to the Legal Committee of the ICAO.
Definitions of a number of other words and phrases included in that
draft are also most desirable, especially in cases which require reconcili-
ation of terms for which the English and American languages use dif-
ferent words.
What appears above provides, in the writer's opinion, a very strong
case not only for drastic revision of almost the whole of the existing
Convention, but also for the incorporation in a new Convention of
many new principles concerning which the existing Convention is
silent.
